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I. INTRODUCTION
While elimination of sexual harassment in the workplace has been
1, 2long anticipated, the law has been slow to develop a meaningful remedy.
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Costilla v. State, addressed a
sexual harassment claim by an employee against her employer where sex-
ual harassment was perpetrated by a non-employee. Finding there was a
question of fact as to the appropriateness of the employer's reaction to
the harassment, the court held in favor of the employee. Significantly,
this holding marked the first time that Minnesota courts have recognized
an employee's cause of action against an employer for sexual harassment
by a non-employee under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
The decision, while representing progress in the area of sexual har-
assment claims, raises several questions. Although finding employers have• 6
a broad duty to protect their employees from sexual harassment, the de-
cision leaves unresolved the standard to be applied in evaluating an em-
ployer's response to a report of third-party sexual harassment.
First, this case note will examine the historical legal development in
preventing and remedying sexual harassment in the workplace.7 Next,
this case note will set out and explain the Costilla decision, which includes
an examination of the extent and nature of employer liability for third-
1. See generally Bonnie B. Westnan, Note, The Reasonable Woman Standard:
Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 795 (1992)
(recognizing the increase of sexual harassment claims in the workplace). The law
has developed to remedy instances of unfair and discriminatory labor against
women. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Continental Can
Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980). However, it should also be ac-
knowledged that men are also subject to sexual harassment. See generally Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998) (holding that plain-
tiff's claim involving same sex harassment between men was actionable under Title
VII); Cummings v. Koehn, 568 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. 1997) (allowing male
plaintiff to bring a sexual harassment claim against his employer under the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act for sexual harassment by male supervisor); Karen Kap-
lowitz & Donald P. Harris, Third Party Sexual Harassment: Duties and Liabilities of Em-
ployers, 26 A.B.A. BRIEF 32, n.1 (1997) (citing Debra Kent, Are Men Victims?, USA
WEEKEND, Dec. 18, 1994).
2. See David J. Burge, Note, Employment Discrimination -Defining An Employer's
Liability Under Title VIIfor On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Stan-
dard, 62 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1984); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
3. 571 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 28,
1998).
4. See id. at 590-91.
5. See id. at 597. The court affirmed the trial court's recognition of the cause
of action but reversed the trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. See id.
6. See id. at 592.
7. See infra Part II. and accompanying notes.
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party sexual harassment under the "broad duty" employers have to protect
employees from sexual harassment.8 Finally, this case note explores the
difficulty of applying Costilla to an establishment in which the employer
relies upon the sexuality of its employees as a form of business promo-
tion.9 The reasoning that the court applied in Costilla will be hypotheti-10
cally tested on the facts of a settled sexual harassment case. The nature
of the business-a bar-arguably invited harassment. 1
In order to properly analyze the questions inherent in Costilla, it is
first necessary to examine the history of both Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196412 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 the legisla-
tive devices courts use to remedy sexual discrimination in the workplace.
II. HISTORY
A. Title VII
The past thirty years has seen a gradual evolution in employer liabil-
14 15ity for sexual harassment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted to protect employees against discrimination in "compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
,16ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... .Today, Title VII is
commonly recognized as the source of legal prohibition against sexual
harassment; interestingly, this was not the original intent of congress.!V
Opponents to the Civil Rights Act offered an amendment that included
"sex" as a protected category in an effort to defeat the bill. 8 Much to
8. See infra Part III. and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part IV. and accompanying notes.
10. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
12. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)).
13. See MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.20 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
14. SeeJeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Res-
taurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 168-79
(1997) (analyzing the development of sexual harassment). Sexual harassment is
defined as a "[t]ype of employment discrimination, including sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
prohibited by Federal law (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act) and commonly by
state statutes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). Although enacted by Congress, the
courts rather than the legislature first recognized sexual harassment as actionable
under Title VII. See Burge, supra note 2, at 805.
17. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964); see also BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID
D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 3 (1992).
18. See CHARLES WHALLEN & BARBARA WHALLEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Or THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 115-18 (1985) (describing
1999]
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their surprise, the bill passed as amended' 9 and has now come to be the
basis of federal sexual harassment claims.
What is now referred to as sexual harassment 20 was first recognized by
the courts in 1975 as sex discrimination. The lower courts increasingly
began to recognize sexual harassment as a Title VII violation in the late22 ..
1970s. Initially, the courts only recognized sexual harassment in the
23 24
form of quid pro quo propositioning by employers. In a quid pro quo
claim, an employer would be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its• 25
supervisors. These early cases also required a plaintiff to show a loss of
House floor debate after civil rights opponent Congressman Howard Smith of-
fered an amendment adding sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Bill).
19. See id.
20. Sexual harassment is now more broadly defined as "the imposition of any
unwanted condition on any person's employment because of that person's sex."
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 17, at 4. A traditional narrow definition of sexual
harassment in the workplace is "a demand that a subordinate, usually a woman,
grant sexual favors in order to obtain or retain ajob benefit." Id. at 3-4.
21. See William v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976) (deciding that
retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because the female employee had
declined his sexual advances, constituted sexual harassment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
22. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211,213-15 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.D.C. 1977); Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658.
23. See Rhee, supra note 14, at 167 and n.27. Professor Catherine A. MacKin-
non first used the term "quid pro quo" to describe when "an employer solicits sex-
ual favors from an employee explicitly in exchange for either job security or op-
portunity." CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE STUDYOF SEX DISCRIMINATION 35 (1979); see, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987.
24. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 995; see also Miller, 600 F.2d at 213-15 (recognizing a
cause of action under Title VII when an employee is fired for refusing a supervi-
sor's demand for sexual favors); Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1044 (concluding that "Title
VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the
employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and
conditions that employee's job status evaluation, continued employment, promo-
tion, or other aspects of career development on a favorable response to those ad-
vances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and appropriate re-
medial action after acquiring such knowledge"); Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658
(recognizing a cause of action under Title VII for employer's advances toward
employee).
25. See Miller, 600 F.2d at 213; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(d) (1958). Some courts have applied a strict liability
standard to quid pro quo claims. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
910 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that in a classic quid pro quo case an employer is
strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisors). But see Tomkins, 568 F.2d at
1048-49 (requiring a showing that the employer had actual or constructive knowl-
edge of a supervisor's sexually harassing conduct and failed to take remedial ac-
tion). Cf Barnes, 561 F.2d at 995 (MacKinnon,J., concurring) (recognizing that a
supervisor is not acting within her apparent scope of employment when she ex-
torts sexual consideration from a subordinate in exchange for favorable job ac-
[Vol. 25
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tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimination.
The courts later came to recognize the existence of a hostile work27
environment as a form of sexual harassment. In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, the Supreme Court finally recognized an employee's cause of ac-
tion against an employer for sexual harassment due to a hostile work envi-
ronment under Title VII.
2 9
tion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(1958). The United States Su-
preme Court recently clarified the scope of an employer's liability for harassment
by a supervisor in Burlington Ind. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998) and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290 (1998). The Court stated that
where tangible employment action is taken by a supervisor to the detriment of the
employee, the employer is held strictly liable for the supervisor's act in a claim
brought under Title VII. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268-69; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at
2290-93.
26. See generally Sara Beth Meier, Case Comment, Expanding Title VII to Prohibit
a Sexually Harassing Work Environment, 70 GEO. L.J. 345, 348 (1981) (stating that
case law prior to Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), required the
plaintiff to show that the employer took retaliatory action after sexual advances
were declined); Terence J. Bouressa, Note, Bundy v. Jackson: Eliminating the Need to
Prove Tangible Economic Job Loss in Sexual Harassment Claims Brought Under Title VII, 9
PEPP. L. REV. 907, 908 (1982) (summarizing sexual harassment cases prior to
Bundy v. Jackson).
27. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court
found that a hostile work environment may be created where a supervisor makes
repeated derogatory or suggestive comments about an employee's sex or sexuality.
See id. The court held that such harassment, even without demanding quid pro
quo from the employee, was a form of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.
See id. at 944. The court relied upon race based claims brought under Title VII in
holding that the plaintiff did not have to prove that her employer deprived her of
any tangible job benefits to bring a claim under Title VII. See id. (citing Rogers v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
29. See id. at 57. Sexual harassment must be sufficiently pervasive or severe to
"alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create abusive working con-
ditions." Id. at 67. An employee need not suffer a tangible economic loss to bring
a Title VII sexual harassment claim. See id. at 64.
In recognizing the Act's prohibition against sex discrimination, the Court
noted that there was little legislative history to assist the Court in interpreting the
statute. See id. at 64. In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court
clarified employer liability for a sexually hostile work environment created by an
employer's immediate supervisor. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269; Faragher, 118 S. Ct.
at 2293. The Court defined an affirmative defense available to an employer where
no tangible employment action was taken against an employee:
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
1999]
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Eventually, courts bean to hold employers liable when employees
harassed other employees. The standard for holding an employer liable
for sexual harassment by a co-worker under Title VII is one of negli-
gence. Sexual harassment by a co-employee is a violation of Title VII
where "the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take immediate and appropriate action. 
"
32
Today it can be argued that the duty Title VII imposes on employers,
providing and maintaining a workplace free of sexual harassment, also in-
33
cludes confronting harassment by non-employees. The Minnesota ap-
proach to sexual harassment, although derived from a different source, is
very similar to the Title VII analysis.
B. Minnesota Historical Development
Minnesota courts have relied upon the Minnesota Human Rights
Act 4 ("MHRA") when addressing sex discrimination and sexual harass-
ment claims.35 The MHRA includes sexual harassment as a form of sexual
30. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1010 (10th Cir. 1990).
31. See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 966 (8th Cir.
1993).
32. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1981)).
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e)-(f) (1996) (stating that employers may be re-
sponsible for the acts of non-employees and that "[pirevention is the best tool for
the elimination of sexual harassment" and employers should develop "methods to
sensitize all concerned" about the issue of sexual harassment); see also infra note
72. In declining to recognize employer liability for sexual harassment by a super-
visor a federal district court made the following pessimistic statement: "[A]n out-
growth of holding [repeated verbal and physical sexual advances towards an em-
ployee by a supervisor] to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential
federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented ad-
vances toward another. One court observed that the only sure way an employer
could avoid such charges would be to have employees who were asexual. See
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975) (vacated
and remanded in Come v. Bausch & Lomb., Inc., 562 f. 2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). The
legal standard for addressing sexual harassment in the workplace appears to have
evolved to the point where employers are required to protect employees from sex-
ual harassment. See supra note 29. However, this standard arguably allows for a
"sexually charged" work environment like a bar. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters:
Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Work Environment Sexual Har-
assment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1115 (1995) (arguing that an employer
which uses the sex appeal of its serving staff as business promotion should be al-
lowed the assumption of risk defense in cases where an employee brings a sexual
harassment claim against an employer for sexual harassment by customers).
34. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.20 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
35. See Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246-49 (Minn. 1980);
Olsen v. City of Lakeville, No. C3-97-390, 1997 WL 561254, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 9, 1997). But see Bruchas v. Preventive Care, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 440, 442-43
[Vol. 25
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discrimination" and defines the circumstances where a hostile work envi-S 37
ronment is created. Minnesota courts have applied principles developed
under Title VII for purposes of construing the MHRA.38 To make a prima
facie case of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show five factors: (1) the
employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was
based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer had knowledge or
constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take timely and
appropriate action. This same test is applied to sexual harassment
claims brought under Title VII.
4 0
In this historical context, the legal ramifications of the Costilla deci-
sion can be fully understood.
III. THE COSTILLA DECISION
A. Facts
Maria Costilla ("Costilla") was employed by the State of Minnesota in
the Department of Economic Security ("DES") as a state monitor advo-
cate. The position required her to work closely with Herman Acosta
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing an employer's common law duty of care to
include liability for sexual harassment where there is physical injury or threat of
physical injury).
36. SeeMINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 14 (1996).
37. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41 (1996).
38. See, e.g., Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978). The
MHRA's prohibition against employment discrimination appears to be broader
than that of Title VII. See Continental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 248-50. Compare MINN.
STAT. § 363.03, subd.1 (1996) .(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to pub-
lic assistance, membership or activity in a local commission, disability, sexual ori-
entation, or age") with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (forbidding discrimination with
regard to an individual's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin").
39. See, e.g., Bersie v. Zycad Corp., 399 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41 (1996).
40. See Bersie, 399 N.W.2d at 146 (applying the harassment test from Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lth Cir. 1982)). The federal courts have stated
that a plaintiff must show: "(1) She belongs to a protected class; (2) the conduct in
question was unwelcome; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment; and (5)
there is some basis for imputing liability to the employer." Magnuson v. Peak
Technical Servs., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 500, 512 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citing Swentek v.
U.S. Air, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir. 1987)).
41. See State v. Costilla, 571 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review
denied, (Minn. Jan. 28, 1998). In this capacity, Costilla worked with urban Hispan-
1999]
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S ,.42("Acosta"), the federal regional monitor advocate employed by the
United States Department of Labor.43 Costilla and Acosta together per-
formed on-site reviews of Minnesota advocate offices, which involved visit-
ing various rural locations requiring overnight stays." Costilla also at-
tended out of town professional training sessions with Acosta. 45
Costilla claimed that beginning in 1992 Acosta committed numerous
acts of sexual harassment" in the course of their professional relation-.47
ship. She further maintained that the State was made aware of the har-
assment on several occasions. 48 A co-worker of Costilla told the DES af-
firmative action officer about specific harassing behavior by Acosta during
a training session in Chicago. The officer told Costilla that she would no
longer have to work alone with Acosta and helped her arrange to see a
counselor to discuss the harassment. 50 The officer spoke with Acosta's su-
pervisor about his behavior and was told that the supervisor would talk to
Acosta about sexual harassment.51 Nonetheless, the harassing behavior
continued until June 1995 when a high-ranking DES commissioner con-
tacted the federal regional administrator in Chicago and insisted that
52Acosta have no further contact with Costilla. Costilla subsequently filed
suit, claiming she was the victim of sexual harassment.5s
B. The Court's Analysis
1. Overview
The Costilla court, affirming the trial court, recognized Costilla's
cause of action under the MHRA.54 The court drew on three sources of
law in determining that the MHRA allows an employee to bring an action
against her employer for sexual harassment when the harassing party is a
ics and seasonal migrant farm workers. See id.
42. See id. at 589. Costilla brought a separate cause of action against Herman
Acosta and the United States Department of Labor. See id. at 590.
43. See id. at 589.
44. See id. Costilla claimed specific acts of sexual harassment occurred during
these overnight trips. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. The specific behavior complained of included inappropriate
comments, touching, grabbing, attempted kissing, and solicitations. See id.
47. See id. at 589-90.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 589. Linda Sloan was the DES affirmative action officer during
the period relevant to this action. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 590. Costilla filed suit in January 1996. See id.
53. See id. at 589.
54. See id. at 597.
[Vol. 25
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non-employee.55 First, the court relied upon the Equal Employment Op-. . . . 56
portunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines. Second, the court looked
57to comparable decisions from other jurisdictions. Third, the court re-
55. See id. at 591.
56. See id. The court was guided by EEOC guidelines, which state in relevant
part:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate cor-
rective action. In reviewing these cases, the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility, which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1996).
It should be noted that EEOC guidelines are not binding on the court.
See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976). They are, however,
entitled judicial deference. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971). EEOC guidelines have been recognized or adopted in whole or in part in
several sexual harassment cases. See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 603
(7th Cir. 1985) (adopting EEOC guidelines for strict liability); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 879, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e), which
notes that an employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing EEOC guide-
lines as a useful basis for injunctive relief in sexual harassment cases); Jarman v.
City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11 (e) in stating that a non-employee is capable of creating a sexually hostile
work environment); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D.
Nev. 1992) (noting the lack of case law on the issue, the court referred to the
EEOC guidelines for guidance in determining whether an employer could be li-
able for the sexual harassment of an employee by a non-employee). See also Meri-
tor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing that EEOC guidelines
support the view that sexual harassment leading to non-economic injury can vio-
late Title VII).
57. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 591. The Costilla court noted that in recent
years numerous federal courts of appeal and federal district courts have held that
employers may be held liable for sexual harassment by third parties. See id. (citing
Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an employer may be liable when a patron sexually harasses an employee if the
employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate
and/or corrective actions when it knows or should have known of the conduct);
Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the em-
ployee had a reasonable expectation that Title VII protected her from being sub-
jected to sexually offensive remarks at a seminar that her employer required her to
attend); Henson, 682 F.2d at 910 (noting that any person, even a non-employee,
can create a hostile work environment); Jarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp.
1375, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that the defendant city could be found liable
for failing to take appropriate immediate corrective action with respect to sexual
harassment of an employee by a non-employee alderman); Magnuson v. Peak
9
Sanville: Employment Law—Employer Liability for Third-party Sexual Harassme
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
viewed the application of the MHRA to other workplace sexual harass-
ment cases and the Minnesota Supreme Court's liberal and remedial in-
terpretation of the MHRA with respect to removing sex discrimination
58
from the workplace.
2. MHRA Analysis and Continuing Violation Doctrine
After determining that Costilla could proceed with her cause of ac-
tion under the MHRA, the court considered discrimination claims involv-
ing continuing violations brought under the MHRA59 and recognized that
a reasonable fact finder could find that the State's actions were an inap-60
propriate response. In addition, the court determined that the State's
acquiescence to Costilla's sexual harassment occurred within the MHRA61
limitations period under the continuing violation doctrine. The court
resolved the limitations issue, explaining that the continuing violation
doctrine provides an exception to the MHRA statute of limitations where
a series of related unlawful employment practices, such as sexual harass-
Tech. Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that an em-
ployee had a cause of action against her employer for sexual harassment acts by
non-employees); Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1028 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that the ca-
sino employer could be held liable for sexual harassment by customers); EEOC v.
Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that an em-
ployer could be held liable for requiring an employee to wear a revealing uniform
which would knowingly lead to sexual harassment from third parties); Woods-
Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (find-
ing that an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment by an independent
contractor); see also Kudatzky v. Galbreath Co., No. 96 Civ. 2693(HB), 1997 WL
598586, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1997) (denying summary judgment where there
is a question of fact whether the employer was liable for sexual harassment of an
employee by a customer); Hallberg v. Eat 'N Park, No. Civ. A. 94-1888, 1996 WL
182212, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1996) (recognizing that an employer may be held
liable when a customer sexually harasses an employee); Sparks v. Regional Med.
Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 738 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (reviewing a claim despite the fact
that defendant was not an employee of hospital). But see Whitaker v. Carney, 778
F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that Title VII does not impose an obligation
on employers to insure that employees are free from sexual harassment or dis-
crimination by non-employees); Attardo v. Salvador, 688 So.2d 1296, 1297 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that there is no cause of action against an employer for sexual
harassment by a non-employee under the federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes). Cf DeWater v. State, 921 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1996) (holding that a
foster parent is not considered an employee of the state, and thus, the state cannot
be held vicariously liable for a foster parent's actions).
58. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 592.
59. See id. at 593.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 594. Although the trial court did not decide the MHRA statute
of limitations issue, the court of appeals elected to review the matter. See id. at 592








ment, occur over a period of time.
Next, the Costilla court reasoned that to determine whether the State
acted inappropriately, it must consider whether the employer's actions63
were reasonable. The court considered the "employer's ability to con-
trol the non-employee" together with the broad MHRA requirement that
an employer "take timely and appropriate action to protect employees,64
from sexual harassment." The court acknowledged that in the case at
bar there was significant interaction between the plaintiffs employer and
65
the third-party's employer. However, the court seemed to give more
weight to the MHRA requirement that an employer take timely and ap-
66
propriate action to protect its employees. The court noted that "the
State's acquiescence in the harassment is established either by [the DES
affirmative action officer's] failure to communicate the seriousness of the
harassment to Costilla's supervisors, or by the supervisors' disregard for
Costilla's safety."
67
Concluding that there was a cuestion of material fact as to the ap-
propriateness of the State's action, the court reversed the trial court's
grant of summaryjudgment in favor of the State. 69 The court speculated
that the State's response to the continuing violation was inappropriate be-
cause, as later demonstrated, the State was able to quickly stop the har-
assment with one letter from a high-ranking state official to a high-ranking
federal official.
70
62. See Costilla 571 N.W.2d at 593; see also Lane v. Ground Round, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 1219, 1224 (E.D. Mo. 1991). The court in Costilla relied upon MHRA cases,
holding that "the continuing violation doctrine acts as an exception to the MHRA
statute of limitations and allows a complainant to hold an employer liable for a
series of related acts of sexual harassment if the 'unlawful employment practice
manifests itself over time.'" Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 593 (quoting Lane, 775 F. Supp.
at 1224).
63. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 593.
64. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(3) (1996)); see also Cummings v.
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1997) (recognizing that the plaintiff must
show that the employer failed to take appropriate and timely action); 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(e) (1996).
65. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 594.
66. See id. at 593-94.
67. Id. at 594 n.2.
68. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 594.
69. See id. at 597.
70. See id. at 594.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COSTILLA DECISION
A. Introduction
The Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in Costilla constitutes a
logical and necessary expansion of sexual harassment law.71 By extending
employee liability to third party harassment, the court demonstrated
sound judicial reasoning that is consistent with both legal authority72 and
society's demand for the elimination of sexual harassment in the work-
place. In analyzing the scope of the Costilla decision, it is helpful to first
determine the liability theme chosen by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
Next, two questions left unanswered by the Costilla court must be explored
in order to guide practitioners and courts in their application of sexual
harassment principles. These questions relate to the reasonableness of
the employer's reaction to sexual harassment and the amount of control
the employer has over the non-employee. Finally, the Costilla principles
must be applied to a de facto harassing situation in order to determine
which defenses are available to the employer and in which situations the
Costilla court's reasoning is relevant.
71. Moreover, the court's holding is consistent with the federal regulatory
scheme for sexual harassment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)-(e) (1996). Recognizing
that employer liability for the sexual harassment of an employee by a non-
employee is an important development in judicial remedies for workplace sexual
harassment. See Collen M. Davenport, Case Note, Sexual Harassment Under Title VII:
Equality in the Workplace or Second-Class Status?: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 193, 208 (1987); Tina Kirstein Ezzell, Note,
Eradicating Title VII Sexual Harassment by Recognizing an Employer's Duty to Prohibit
Sexual Harassment, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 383, 383 (1991); see also supra note 1 and ac-
companying text; cf Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghe-
toization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1993) (suggesting prosecution of
street harassment such as catcalls, leers, winks, and grabs).
72. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(3) (1996). Sexual harassment occurs
when "the employer knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and
fails to take timely and appropriate action." Id. Other states offer similar statutory
protections against sexual harassment. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 155B, § 4,
subd. 1 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1996).
73. See Derrick Z. Jackson, After the Thomas Affair, Progress-or Silence?, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1991, at A37; Kathleen Murray, Workplace: Fighting Sexual Harass-
ment Goes Beyond Co-Workers, to Clients, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H2; Sexual
Harassment at Work Grows as Global Concern, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1992, at A5;John L.
Smith, Tradition, Changing Times Collide in Sex Harassment Case, LAS VEGAS REv. J.,
July 29, 1993, at BI; Helen Wintemitz, Anita Hill: One Year Later, WORKING WOMAN,
Sept. 1992, at 21. Cf Clinton v.Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1638 (1998).
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B. The Costilla Reasoning
1. The Court of Appeals' Chosen Theme
Three themes emerge in the decisions of cases in which employers
were held liable for third-party sexual harassment: (1) the third party's
control over the employee; (2) employer enforced dress code; and (3) an
employer's broad duty to protect employees from sexual harassment.7 4
The third party control situation arises where the employee is placed in a
position under the "control" of the third party.7 5 The second theme in-
volves an employer enforced dress code that invites sexual harassment by
the public. 7 6 Where the employer requires an employee to wear a uni-
form that is sexually revealing, the employer arguably forces the employee
to concede to sexual harassment by the public, sometimes as a condition
77
for continued employment. The rationale of the third theme is an em-
ployer's broad duty to protect employees from sexual harassment.78 While
79
the Costilla court seems to have adopted this last approach, it provides
little guidance relative to application or effect.
2. Unanswered Questions
An employer has a duty to take whatever action is reasonably calcu-
lated to end the sexual harassment of an employee whether the harassing
74. See Costilla v. State, 571 N.W.2d 587, 592 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review
denied, (Minn. Jan. 28, 1998) (citing Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F.
Supp. 738, 743 (D. Minn. 1997)).
75. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743 (citing Magnuson v. Peak Technical
Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992); Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994
WL 566943, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994)).
76. See EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assoc., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986)
(involving employees required to wear provocative outfits pursuant to a marketing
scheme); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(involving an employee required to wear a provocative uniform as a condition of
her employment); State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Minn.
1996) (involving a situation where complainants' sexual discrimination claims re-
garding revealing uniforms were dismissed due to failure of the Minnesota De-
partment of Human Rights to issue a timely probable cause determination).
77. See Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 609-10.
78. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (l1th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an employer is strictly liable for actions of its supervisors which result
in sexual harassment); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028
(D. Nev. 1992) (holding that an employer can be liable under Title VII for sexual
harassment of an employee by a non-employee, including its customers). But see
Whitaker v. Carney, 778 F.2d 216, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining to hold that
Title VII places a duty on the employer to solicit complaints from victims or pro-
vide a formal grievance procedure).
79. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 592.
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party is the employee's supervisor or co-worker."s Under Costilla, the same
rules seem to apply to harassment by third parties. The questions that Cos-
tilla leaves unanswered are: (1) when is the employer's response going to
be "timely," and (2) what is the "appropriate action" to be taken by an
employer when responding to third-party harassment? These questions81
were remanded to the trial court. Both are questions of fact, and their
82
answers depend on variable fact-specific circumstances. Furthermore,
the court acknowledged that the employer's ability to control the non-
employee is a consideration in determining the reasonableness of the
83employer's response, but the court did not provide any guidance as to
what extent of control is required. The answers to these questions are
crucial if the bench and bar of Minnesota are to meaningfully consider
claims of third-party sexual harassment in the workplace.
a. Reasonableness Undefined?
The court stated that it applied a "reasonableness standard" in evalu-
ating the employer's reaction to Costilla's claim of sexual harassment.
84
This reasonableness standard considers the employer's control over the
non-employer and "the MHRA's broad purpose of requiring employers to
take timely and appropriate action to protect employees from sexual har-
assment." When determining whether an employer took timely or ap-
propriate remedial action regarding a complaint of sexual harassment by
a co-worker, Minnesota courts take into consideration whether the em-
ployer disseminated an anti-harassment policy to the offending employ-
ees, transferred the offending employee to another shift, or took or
86threatened to take disciplinary action against the offending employees.
In other words, an employer has an affirmative duty to investigate com-
80. The Eighth Circuit has been applying this standard for many years. See
Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc. 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993); Davis v. Tri-
State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992); Barrett v. Omaha
Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
256 (4th Cir. 1983)). Minnesota courts have applied this standard in practice. See
Tore v. Health Dimensions, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Fears v. Seagate Tech. Inc., No. C5-97-777, 1998 WL 27243, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 1998). Moreover, remedial action that is "reasonably calculated to end the
harassment" is the general standard for avoiding liability for hostile work envi-
ronment. See Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt and Effective Remedial Action"? What Must
an Employer Do To Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work Environmental" Sexual Harassment?,
8 LAB. LAw 181, 184 (1992).
81. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 591.
82. See Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 1, at 34.
83. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 593.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See McNabb v. Cub Foods, 352 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1984); Tore v.
Health Dimensions, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
[Vol. 25
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/11
COSTILLA V. STATE
plaints of sexual harassment and deal appropriately with the offending
personnel.
8 7
Although Minnesota courts have not required an employer to prom-
ulgate written policies to deal with allegations of sexual harassment, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has stated that a company that fails to insti-
tute such a policy is likely to have knowledge of the harassment imputed
88
to them. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has previously stated that the89
MHRA is not preventative, but rather is remedial in nature, but it ap-
pears that the court's interpretation of timely and appropriate remedial
measures under the employer's broad duty to protect employees from
harassment could actually be interpreted as a duty to prevent both known
and anticipated harassment.
While the reasonableness standard is an important part of the Costilla
decision, the issue of third-party sexual harassment also gives rise to a new
consideration in holding an employer liable for sexual harassment-the
extent of the employer's control over the harasser.
b. The Paradox of Control
Historically, the issue of control has not been considered by the
courts because they have traditionally found employer liability based upon90
theories sounding in agency. However, non-employee sexual harass-
ment raises questions of control outside of the employment relationship
recognized under theories of agency law. The Costilla court noted that de-
termining whether an employer's actions were timely and appropriate in-
volves consideration of both the employer's ability to control the non-
employee and the broad duty the MHRA imposes upon employers to pro-
tect employees from sexual harassment. 91 However, a paradox is created
where the employer has a duty to protect an employee from someone over92
whom it may not have any control. There may be many real world illus-
87. See Gillson v. State, 492 N.W.2d 835, 841 (citing Continental
Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 251 (Minn. 1980)).
88. See Guiliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Minnesota does not employ a standard of strict liability for sexual harassment by
supervisors or managers, however the court will impute supervisor knowledge of
harassment to the employer. See McNabb, 352 N.W.2d at 383.
89. See Tore, 509 N.W.2d at 561.
90. See supra note 25.
91. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 593.
92. It is also reasonably foreseeable that there are some situations in which
the employer would be reluctant to fulfill its duty to the employee (i.e. taking ac-
tion to stop sexual harassment of that employee) where the harasser is a valued
client or customer. Moreover, it is common for third-party sexual harassment to
go unreported by the affected employee either due to the client or supplier's eco-
nomic importance to the employer or for fear of being perceived as not being able
to handle the work environment. See Robert S. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sex-
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trations of this paradox, but the actual facts of a single settled sexual har-
assment action involving Hooters, Inc. will be used as an illustration.
3. Illustration
The "Hooters concept" is a restaurant theme that originated with
Hooters of America, Inc.93 Hooters of America describes Hooters as "[a]
casual, beach-theme restaurant known for the Hooters Girls - the surfer
girl next door"9 4 and admits that "[t]he element of female sex appeal is
prevalent in the restaurants." 95 Arguably, this business concept, and par-
ticularly the restaurant's provocative dress code, invites, induces, and in-
cites sexual harassment. The question becomes-how does the Costilla
reasoning apply to sexual harassment by third parties when the very na-
ture of the employer's business invites sexual harassment? Specifically,
how do the timely and appropriate standards of reasonableness apply
where the employer itself creates a "sexually charged" atmosphere?
Similar issues have been raised in litigation (ultimately resulting in
negotiated settlements) against Hooters, Inc., but never addressed by
97Minnesota appellate courts. The plaintiffs in the district court cases
ual Harassment of Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?,
21 PEPP. L. REv. 447, 447-50 (1994); L.A. Winokur, Workplace: Harassment of Workers
by 'Third Parties' Can Lead Into Maze of Legal, Moral Issues, WALL ST. J. Oct. 26, 1992,
at BI (reporting testimonials of working women faced with sexual harassment by
business clients and their reluctance to report the harassment to their employers).




96. Hooters, Inc., has been accused of creating a harassing environment. See
infra note 99 and accompanying text, which outlines the allegations. The required
uniform of Hooters bar consists of the following: "Hooters T-shirt, 1/2 shirt, or tank
top (Hooters Girls only), orange 'Dolfin's' shorts, white bra, suntan panty hose
(non-design), clean white tennis shoes and socks, name-badge, pouch/belt, prom-
like appearance (hair, make-up and nails done neatly), positive attitude showing
through, prettiest smile in the whole world!" Rajan Chaudhry, Holding Hooters
Close to Heart, RESTAURANT & INSTITUTIONS, Aug. 15, 1995, at 30 (quoting Hooters
Employee Handbook, at 24). See also Hooters, www.hootersofamerica.com (visited
Jan. 23, 1999) <http://www.hootersofamerica.com/newpages/info.html.> ("[T]he
Hooters Girl uniform consists of orange shorts and white tank top, short sleeves or
long sleeves T-shirt. Pantyhose and bras are required."). The national restaurant
chain acknowledges that its "business is on the female sex appeal side." Paul A.
Driscoll, Hooters Settles Gender Bias Suit, Deal Will Allow Chain to Continue with Female
Staff WIS. ST.J., Oct. 1, 1997, at 8B (quoting a spokesman for the restaurant, Mike
McNeil).
97. See Felepe v. Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-11134 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
filed July 1, 1993); Miller v. Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-6672 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. filed Apr. 20, 1993); T. Schoellermann v. Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-
6670 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 20, 1993). The district court never ruled on these
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claimed that the company intended to create a hostile work environment
98
and was liable for sexual harassment by its customers. The plaintiffs'
complaints made specific allegations, including: (1) customer requests for
sexual intercourse and touching; (2) a request by a customer for wait-
resses to "sit on his face;" (3) a customer asking the plaintiff to sit on his
lap; (4) a customer refusing to pay his bill until the waitress would take off
her shirt; (5) customers asking waitresses if they knew another waitress'
bra size; and (6) customers commenting about women's breasts and but-
tocks and asking if they were wearing underwear.9 9 These examples im-
plicate basic tenets sexual harassment jurisprudence: the unwelcomeness
of the harassment and assumption of risk doctrine.
a. Unwelcomeness
Minnesota state and federal courts, as well as the United States Su-
preme Court, recognize that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.""'0 Courts
have applied both objective and subjective standards in determining if
sexual advances or conduct were undesirable and offensive. 10' A claimant
does not have to show that the employer intended to create an abusive or
hostile work environment, but rather sexual harassment claimants must
demonstrate specific consequences or effects of an employment prac-102
tice. The United States Supreme Court has held that the conduct must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive such that a reasonable person would
matters because settlements were reached between the parties. See Sclafani Rhee,
supra note 14, at 165 n.10 (citing "Hooters"Accord Reached, NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994,
at A8).
98. See Rhee, supra note 14, at 165-66 (citing Complaint at 11, Felepe v.
Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-11134 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filedJuly 1, 1993)).
99. See Complaint at 12, Felepe v. Bloomington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-11134
(Minn. Dist. Ct. filedJuly 1, 1993); Complaint at 8, Miller v. Bloomington Hooters
(Minn. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 20, 1993); Complaint at 7, T. Schoellermann v. Bloom-
ington Hooters, Inc., No. 93-6670 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 20, 1993).
100. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); see also Bums v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993); Waag v. Thomas
Pontiac, 930 F. Supp. 393, 401 (D. Minn. 1996); Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C6-
95-962, 1996 WL 33116, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 30, 1996).
101. Compare Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (applying an objective evaluation of the
claimants participation in a sexual relationship with her supervisor) with Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (applying a subjective standard
in determining that the claimant found the employer's conduct undesirable and
offensive).
102. See Cristv. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 1997); Ellison
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that "[t]o avoid liability
under Title VII employers may have to educate and sensitize their workforce to
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find the environment hostile or abusive, thus altering the condition of the
claimant's employment. Additionally, the claimant must subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive. 0
The determination of whether a work environment is hostile is a fact-
intensive question that requires "consideration of the circumstances, in-
cluding the frequency of the conduct and its severity"' ° and in some situa-
tions, the claimant's "expectations given their choice of employment."' ° 6
This latter concept echoes the assumption of risk doctrine.
b. Assumption of Risk
Scholars have offered two alternative theories in analyzing sexual
harassment claims in the unique situation where a woman knowingly
agrees to work in an environment that exemplifies her sexuality.' °7 One
school of thought opposes the marketing of women's sexuality viewing it
as the exploitation and disempowerment of women. 08 The other school
maintains that a woman in an establishment with a sexually charged envi-
ronment consciously consents to commodify her sexuality, thereby assum-
ing the risk of sexual harassment by customers, and the employer should
not be held liable for harassment that follows.1°9 The argument can be
103. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
104. See id. The Court also clarified that injuring a plaintiffs psychological
well-being was actionable under Title VII. See id. Some jurisdictions, including the
Eighth Circuit, have adopted a "reasonable woman" standard to determine if the
conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment." (citing Ellison 924 F.2d at 879, 879
n.3, and noting that a reasonable woman under similar circumstances is the ap-
propriate standard to apply in determining the existence of a hostile work envi-
ronment).
105. Crist, 122 F.3d at 1111 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23). The courts apply
a totality of the circumstances approach when evaluating a claim of a hostile work
environment. SeeHarris, 510 U.S. at 23.
106. Crist, 1221F.3datl111.
107. See Rhee, supra note 14, at 167.
108. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAw 35 (1987). Many critics condemn the commodification of a woman's
sexuality by establishments such as Hooters in that they create an "atmosphere
that legitimizes and invites sexual harassment." Barbara Kasper & Barbara Moore,
WAVE'S Review of Hooters, (last modifiedJune 25, 1997) <http://www.mooreresults.
com/WAVE/hootrev.html>; see also, Bob Gardinier, NOW Protests Hooters at Mall,
TIMES UNION, Oct. 29, 1995, at D4; Bill Schackner, S. Side Bar is Target of Feminist
Protest, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 6, 1994, at C6.
109. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Bean Assumption of Risk Defense to
Some Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims , 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1130-33
(1995). Cahill proposes that the assumption of risk defense should be applied in
hostile work environment sexual harassment law and where sex appeal is a sub-
stantial part of the employer's business. See id. In those instances, the employer
should be allowed to argue that the employee assumed the risk of sexual harass-
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made, with respect to an allegedly sexually charged atmosphere at places
such as Hooters, Inc., that an employee assumes all risks by choosing to
work in that environment.
In contrast, the facts of Costilla do not implicate assumption of risk.
Clearly, assumption of risk would have no application where Costilla had
the expectation of a benign work environment free from unwanted sexual
attention. 10 However, future application of the Costilla court's reasoning
could have effects of which extend to a "de facto" harassing environment.
c. Applying the Costilla Analysis to a De Facto "Harassing
Environment"
The Costilla court clearly states that employers have a duty to take
timely and appropriate actions to protect their employees from sexual111
harassment by nonemployees. The logical extension of this duty would
be to find employers such as Hooters liable for the conduct of their cus-
tomers when such employers fail to take timely and appropriate action to
protect their employees. As applied to an environment that allegedly ex-
ists at Hooters, a court may likely determine that an employer's response
to sexual harassment by customers can be neither timely nor appropriate
where: (1) the employer solicits the potential harassers to the work envi-
ronment; (2) the employer creates and promotes an atmosphere that em-
phasizes the sexuality of women; 12 (3) the employer enforces a dress code
requiring female employees to wear a sexually revealing uniform; 113 and
ment by customers because she consented to work in the environment knowing
the risk. See id. See also Andrew Blum, Assumption of Risk Tested in Hooters Suit,
NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 7 (reporting one local attorney's reactions to former
employees' lawsuits against Hooters).
110. In Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., the Eighth Circuit stated that employees who
chose to work in a group home for developmentally disabled did not assume the
risk of being subjected to sexually inappropriate conduct of one of the mentally
incapacitated residents. See Crist, 122 F.3d at 1110. The court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and held that the employees who were subject
to the allegedly inappropriate conduct had a cognizable claim under Title VII and
the Minnesota Human Rights Act against their former employer. See id. at 1108.
111. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 590-92.
112. The national restaurant chain acknowledges that its "business is on the
female sex appeal side." Driscoll, supra note 96, at 8B (quoting a spokesman for
the restaurant, Mike McNeil). Hooters of America also admits that "[t]he element
of female sex appeal is prevalent in the restaurants." Hooters, Inc., Hooters,
www.hootersofamerica.com (visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http:/www.hootersofamerica.com
/newpages/info.html>.
113. See supra note 96 for a description of the required uniforms. This factor
alone is, arguably, a basis for a claim of sexual harassment. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage
Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Aalberts & Seidman,
supra note 92, at 459 (considering a bona fide occupation defense for establish-
ments that required employees wear provocative attire).
1999]
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(4) the employer's employee handbook suggests that its employees should
not complain if they find their "duties, uniform requirements, or work en-
vironment" "offensive, intimidating, hostile or unwelcomed." 4  It is
therefore conceivable that establishments such as Hooters would be im-
mediately liable for even a single instance of harassment by virtue of their
broad duty to protect their employees from harassment. However, such
an employer may assert the affirmative defense that their employees as-
sumed the risk by choosing to work in such an environment.
1 6
V. CONCLUSION
Costilla does set important precedent because it recognizes the full
protections of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the instructive value of
EEOC guidelines, and conforms Minnesota case law with progressive case
law on the issue in other jurisdictions. Costilla provides notice and warns
of potential claims against employers for non-employee sexual harass-
ment. Most importantly, Costilla encourages employers to devise a policy
regarding harassment by non-employees and inform employees of com-
plaint procedures.
114. Chaudhry, supra note 96, at 30 (quoting Hooters' Employee Handbook,
at 30). The Hooters' Employee Handbook provides the following acknowledg-
ment to be signed by their employees:
I hereby acknowledge and affirm ... (3) that the Hooters concept is
based on female sex appeal and that the work environment is one in
which joking and innuendo based on female sex appeal is commonplace.
I also acknowledge and affirm that I do not find my job duties, uni-
form requirements, or work environment to be offensive, intimidating,
hostile or unwelcomed.
(Employee signature and date; Witness (Manager) signature and date.)
Id. (quoting Hooters' Employee Handbook, at 30). The Hooters' Employee
Handbook also contains the following statement: "I hereby acknowledge and af-
firm ... that I should immediately notify company officials of any sexual harass-
ment complaints that I might have." Id. (quoting Hooters' Employee Handbook,
at 30). However, in light of the acknowledgment that the employee does not find
her job "offensive, intimidating, hostile or unwelcomed," this acknowledgment
loses significance and potency.
115. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 593.
116. For example, Hooters may point to the signed acknowledgment discussed
above (in supra note 114), but the legality of such a "waiver" is probably question-
able. Additionally, as discussed above, the facts of Costilla do not raise an assump-
tion of risk defense, but Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir.
1997), suggests that employees do not assume the risk of working in an environ-
ment where employees may be subject to sexually harassing conduct by third par-
ties. See supra Part. IV.B.3.b.
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The court, however, failed to clarify the extent of employers' broad
duty to protect employees from sexual harassment. The Minnesota Court
of Appeals did not define a clear standard. The Minnesota Supreme
Court declined review. Just as employees waited for the courts to develop
the existing judicial protections regarding sexual harassment in the work-
place, employers must now wait for further clarification regarding their
duty to protect employees from all sexual harassment and the scope of
their liability if they do not.
Meanwhile, the potential reach of Costilla is unpredictable. Specifi-
cally, the boundaries of timeliness, reasonableness, and indeed of any of
the theories applied in Costilla are questionable when one contemplates a
work environment based upon sex appeal. Absent clear parameters, em-
ployers and owners of such establishments have few guideposts; conse-
quently, their ability to craft policies and take measures to protect their
employees and themselves is severely impaired. Given the opportunity to
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